A memorandum on trade with Soviet Russia: submitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, January, 1921... by Spargo, John
University of Central Florida 
STARS 
PRISM: Political & Rights Issues & Social Movements 
1-1-1921 
A memorandum on trade with Soviet Russia: submitted to the 
Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, 
January, 1921... 
John Spargo 
Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/prism 
University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu 
This Book is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted for inclusion in PRISM: Political 
& Rights Issues & Social Movements by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more information, please contact 
STARS@ucf.edu. 
Recommended Citation 
Spargo, John, "A memorandum on trade with Soviet Russia: submitted to the Committee on Foreign 
Relations of the United States Senate, January, 1921..." (1921). PRISM: Political & Rights Issues & Social 
Movements. 761. 
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/prism/761 
With Soviet Russia 
A Memorandum on Trade 
With Soviet Russia 
Submitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations 
of the United States Senate, January 1921, in con- 
nection with the Hearing upon the Resolution of 
the Hon. Joseph I. France, Relating to ,the Resump- 
tion of Trade with Soviet Russia. 
R W  with the P d i m  of thu Anthot 
BY TRO 
Russian Information Bureau in the U. S. 
W O O L W O R T H  B U I L D I N G  
NEW YORK CfTY 
The Question of Trade 
With Soviet Russia 
A Menwrandum swbmittd to the Committee on For+ Reb- 
tiom of the United States Smote, January, 1921, C conn#cih 
dh the hearitlg uton the Resolution of the Hon. Josepk I.  
France, reluting to tkr remtnption of trade d h  Soviet R d  
BY 
JOHN SPARGO 
Author of "Russirr As As American P~roblem,~ etc., etc. 
That the restoration of trade between the United States and 
Russia, and its extmsive development, are desirabIe, s c a d y  
admits of discussion or dispute. As a student of Russian histoy 
and politics during many years, I bave long held that the interest 
of the civilized world in general, not less than that of Russia 
herset f, require the jntensifieation of Russian prcduetion, both 
industrid and agricultural, and the - d o n  of Russia's trade 
with other countries, especially t h w  of the Western world. 
Quite early in the World War, in the latter part of 1914, I set 
forth this view in an article which was widely commented u p  
at the time, and was transfated into Russian and cirmlatd 
among the Iders of the Russian democracy by my friend, the 
late Mr. George PIechanov. In my R w ' u  As An American 
Problem, published in February, 1920, I set forth the same view 
at some lengthS fortifying it with an elaborate statistical survey 
of Russia's economic requirements and resources. In that study 
I examined with particular -re the uedit requirements of Fbda 
and the basis for securing such credit. 
From the fagoing it wit1 be recognized that I am entitled 
to daim a sympathetic interest in the object of the R ~ l u t i o n  
by Seaator France. The rapid re-habilitation of the agricuttuc~ 
of Russia is needed to help in putting an end to the famint an- 
dit im which prevail over such a large part of Europe, and her 
raw materials are mrcely less necessary for the r e v i d  of the 
world's industry. Provided only that it can be aceomplishd 
with safety to ourdws, and to the mutua! advantage of the two 
countriw, trade with Russia &odd be resumed, trpon the largest 
possiile d e ,  regardless of Commuaism. There can be no m- 
struction of E u r m  and no economic stability in the world, until 
Russia is brought into normal economic retations with other na- 
tions. Because that is my conviction, based upon the results of 
much study of the problem, I desire to see trade with Russia 
revived as quickly and as extensively as possible, and dqlore the 
necessity of admitting that prolonged and careful investigation 
and study of afl the available data have forced me to reach the 
conclusion that it is not possible for this country to eater into 
trade relations with Soviet Russia, under existing conditions, 
without incurring serious risk of unprecedented economic disaster 
and rwolutionasy upheaval. In  support of this view I desire t~ 
submit to the Committee on Foreign Retations the following 
obswvations and facts : 
11. The Problm Misrepeserrled 
In a i o d  statement pubfishad on Dee. 21, 1920, the former 
Secretary of the Treasury, the Hon. William G, McAdao, said: 
'1 hsve long been convinced that we wght to re-establish trade 
relatiom with Russia. It is not necessary to reoogaize the Soviet 
Government to do this. Why should we refuse to let people 
in distress in Russia or elsewhere buy our products if they can 
pay for them, no matter what form of governmeat they may 
choose for themselv~?" I h d  it difficult to cornprehead that 
the man who as Scary of the Treasury handled with such 
mastery the problems of war finance, could so thoroughly mi, 
conceive the very nature of the problem of dealing with Soviet 
Russia. Ignoring the d-known fact that the present Govern- 
meat of Russia, and the form of that Government, sot by 
any stretch of the imagination be said to reprcscnt the choice of 
the Russian people, I desire to address m y d f  to two othtx pin ts  
in that statement. 
Mr. McAdoo asks ''Why should we refuse to let pqdt  in 
dktras in Russia or elsewhere buy our p d u e b  if theg can pay 
for them, no matter what form of government they may &DM# 
? for themselves?" The issue h e  dram does not exist in fact, as every manber of the Senate Committee on Foreign Belatioms 
I must be aware. Since the Government of the Unittd States, 
in July, 1920, removed practically all restrictions upon trade 
with Russia, except as applied to goods and materials for military 
uses-dctions which amount to a limited embargoI and not 
a blockaduvery possible justification for such a view of the 
problem as that expressed by Mr. M d d o o  has cased to exid 
In New Haven, C o n n h t ,  a few days ago I saw large adwr- 
tising posters conspicuously displayed,, calling upon the thou- 
sands of unemployed warkers in that dty to demand the removal 
of the "blockade1* of Soviet Russia, which, it was alleged, was 
respoasible for their unemployment. The appeal emanated from 
d-known pro-Bolshevist sources. The danger of such aa a p  
peal to masses of unemployed men at this time, can hardly bc 
over-emphahd. It is, of course, quite easy to understand the 
rerklessness of the pro-blshevist p~~ but it is not so 
to understand why responsible statesmen should add to such 
I dangemus propaganda the w i g e  and authkty of their ap- 
prod* 
I In all the aonrmunications made by the Government of tht 
United States to other g o v e ~ t s  upon this question, and all 
the pubbhcd statemeats of policy relating to Russia made by the 
present Administration, there is not a sentence which - be 
-biy interpreted as an objection on the part of the Govern- 
ment or the people of the United States to Russia having u ~ Q V -  
expment by Soviets. On the contrary, the Government of ttse 
I United States has d s t e a t l y  recognized the right of Russia to 
I maintain, as an inviolable prerogative of her soverejgnQ8 anp 
form of government she pleases, so tong as she  doe^ noi violate 
the rights of other nations or of their nationals. We do not 
"refuse to let people who are in d i m  in Russia or W h e r e  
buy our praducb if they can pay for them!' That issue &ply 
does not &, either for the Government or the people of the 
United Stam, or the Govamtmt  or the peoples of any other 
nations, I make this stntement in the most sweeping  tam^ pi- 
sibla; it applies equally to the United Stat-, its Allies in the 
recent War, the enemy nations and dl the neutral natias. 
IIZ. Res#om'bdity of the S&t Gofimment 
The fact is that instead of our Govmnment refusing to Ict 
the people of Russia buy our products, the $resod Sm'et Goch 
emmm! refrcses that right to its &HIS. No R u s h  is 
ot liberty to buy goo& in this or any athw c m r r y  ond to impwt 
thesrr irpto Rwdu. The Soviet Goverament has s u p p d  every 
right of private citizens, whether individuals or commercial ow- 
porations, to tagagt in foreign trade. In Soviet Russia foreign 
trade, both export and import, is an absolute monopoly of the 
State. No trade with Russia can be had except through the 
Soviet Government itself. Ur. R. G. Wells, the English writer, 
in a widely published brief for the resumption of trade with 
Soviet Russia, has had to admit that this is the w, and that '5t 
is hopdesa and impossible, therefore, for individual persons and 
firms to thiak of going to Russia to trade." He righdy insists 
that trade can only be had with Russia through the medium of 
the Sovie$ Govctnmept itself. That he is quite correct in making 
this statement, there is an abundance of iocoatestable evidenu, 
furnished by the aeaedited representatives and spokesmen of the 
SoPict Government. For the present I s W  coatent myself with 
a single citation upon the point: On June 8, Im, the Supmc  
Economic C o d  of the League. of Nations add- a series 
of sixteen questions to the deftgatcs of the Soviet Government. 
The first three questions were as follows : 
"1. Are the delegates of the Soviet Government the only 
persons who have thc right to carry on foreign trade outside 
R l d a ?  
"2. Is the Soviet Government the only body with which for- m traders will be allowed to do business in Russia? 
'"3, What is the lcgat effect and what will be the consequeu= 
of contracts made; (a) with bodies and persons in districts of 
Old Russia* which do not at prcstnt m q n h  thc authorirty 
of the Soviet Government; (b) with bodies or persons in Soviet 
Russia not included under question 2?" 
On June 26, 1920, at the meeting of the Supreme Economic 
Council, the Russian Soviet Delegation, Messrs. Kr&, Nogin, 
Rosovski, and Klyshko, were present and submitted their replies 
to the questions of tbc ComciL The replies to the three qudona 
quoted above were as follows : 
"1. The fursign trdg of S&t Russia i s  a monopoly of b e  
Govcrmmt. The argernizztion through which this monopoly 
functions is the National Commissariat for Foreign T r a d ~  which 
exercises its powers with the assistance of its representatha and 
agents. The delegation of the Soviet Government is the sole 
body which possessa full powers to carry out negotiatims with 
foreign Governments for the resumption of tradc. 
"2. Tbe National Commissariat for Foreign Trade and ifs or- 
ganizations is & only body with which foreigners will be able 
to carry out trade in Russia. 
"3, The d y  contracts which have my Iegd recognition a n  
agreements and contracts made with the Comrnisgariat for For- 
eign Trade and its orpnbations. (a) No responsibility as to the 
fulfillment of agreements and contracts made "with bodies and 
persons in districts of OM Rwsia which do not at pmsmt recog- 
nize the authoritp of the Sotct  Go-t" can be taken by 
the Soviet Government, such agmments having no legal stand- 
ing. (b) An answer can be (given on examiaation of & in- 
dividual case." 
I respectfully submit that (1) the Soviet Government itself has 
suppresstd the right of its citizens to trade with us, and that it 
is contrary to the fact to state that there are people in Russia 
needing our goods, for which they are wifing and able to pay, 
who are prevented from purcfiasing such g d s  by any act of the 
Government or the people of the United States; (2) that there 
w be no important amount of trade with Soviet Russia without 
recognition of the Soviet Govcxnment, for it is d f e s € l y  impos- 
sible for us to have trade transactions involving d t s  of many 
millions, and even billions, of dollars, with a government which 
we do not &e and with which we arc unwilling to main- 
tain normal relati- 
N. TBs Prubie~ Ao It Is 
The real problem of the muuption of tradc with Russia, ua- 
der existing canditions, resolves itself into the fdowbg : The 
Soviet Government, which rules without any other sanction than 
brutal force, wants to principally upon credit, d 
billions of dollars worth of our products. Outside of such a u r i -  
ties for credit as it may have to offer, it has a limited amount of 
gold and platinum, and some raw materials, which it would offer 
in exchange for our g d s .  The sum of the value of the corn- 
mdties  it has to offer in exchange, including the gold and plati- 
num, is so d l  in comparison with the volume of the value of 
the gods desired as to be almost negligible. It is, and must of 
n d t y  k prbcipally a question of trade upon a credit basis. 
The character of the Soviet Govcmment, its stability, its re- 
sources1 the degree of support accorded to it by the Russian pm- 
ple, the prospects of suwessful revolt against it and repudiation 
of its acts, its attitude toward foreign nations and toward such 
of their nationals as may be its creditors, are matters with which 
we may legitimately concern ourselves. More than that, they are 
matters of vital importance which we cannot ignore or treat with 
indifference without incurring the risk of serious disaster. I 
submit tbat the Government of the United States, like every 
other civilized Government, is in honor and morals bound to 
protect the interests of its nationals, and to insist upon just treat- 
ment by other Governments, in accordance with the established 
principles of inhnatioaal law, for itself and its nationals. X sub- 
mit, further, that if there is good m a  to believe that the Soviet 
Government will not deal honestly and in good faith with such 
of our atizens as extend credit to it, but that in pursuance of a 
deliberate policy it will wrong thcm, the United States Govern- 
ment is abundantly justified in disrouraging its nationals from 
entering into trade relations with the Soviet Govenuncnt, and 
warning them that if they do so, they must do so at their own 
risk. 
Upon this point the testimony of Mr. H. G* Web, from whom 
I have previoudy quoted, is pertinent. The fact tbat Mr. WeUs 
bas iadufgd in certain superficial miticisme of the Bolshevist 
ngime, and the further fact tbat he denies king a Miever in 
B o ~ m ,  must not be permitted to blind us to the dgnibnce 
of hihis testimony. H e  visited R d a  upon the invitation of the 
Soviet Government, and as its guest. He enjoyed the privilcga 
of a guest, and was subject to a guest's oblrffations, His criti- 
cisms of the Bolshevist regime and his dcnial of belief in Bol- 
shevism art simply the foil against wbich hc sets to maximum 
advantage the agumnt in favor of trade with Soviet Russia. 
Mr. Wells saps: 
"In all Russia there remain now no commercial individuals 
and bodies with whom we can deal who will respect the conven- 
tions and usages of west= commercial fife. T k  BohFBdrt 
Gmmmmt, W E  h e  fo mderstand, husI by its ndure, an i- 
wimttMbIs prsjudice agw'nst individual blcsllCSlmess wss; it will sot 
tr& them in u w a u m  thut they will regwd ap fair and honor- 
able; it w i U  dbtwst t h m  and, ap far os ib can, put t h m  at thu 
consp&te~$ disadvantage. 
"It h ku#~lgss md hfiossible, ihwefore, f w ididud pwsm 
a d  to thin& of going to Rwsk to trade." 
That tbe statement of Mr. W d s  is true will not be doubted by 
any one who is familiar with the facts. The whole d y  and 
f a r e  propaganda camied m in this country to permade 
our business mea h t  only wr Govermmi prevenb their en- 
joyment of a trade with Russia from which immense profits 
might be derived, the repeated offers of vaImbIe aoadons to 
M a n  capitalists, such as the much discussed Kadmtka 
concdon to Mr. Washington B. Vanderlip and his wwhtes, 
are thomughly dishonest and intended to attain politid rather 
than commerdal ends, as I shall presently attempt to prove by 
widace which your honorabJe body will recognize as wnJusivt 
and incontestable. 
For the mcanent, however, let me mume the umecbess of the 
sta- by Mr. W d s :  If there are no individual business 
men or firms in Russia with whom Amuieau citizens can 
and if it is YhopeIess and impossible" for any individual c&um 
or firms "to think of going to Russia to trade," o b v i d y  thert 
can be no a l t d v e  method of t r s e  trade with Soviet Btw 
sia save fhmugb a revolution in our own economic system WW 
would make our Governmat the soh agenep for e i n g  at 
such trade. In other words, trade with R u A  must b madt 
a Government monopoly, the United States Govemmcnt dealing 
directly with the Soviet Government. This means one of two 
things: either we must go bodily over to Cammunism, so that 
the Communist Government of the United S t a b  would d d  
directly with the Communist Government of Soviet Russia, or the 
United States Government must itself assume the functions of a 
trustee and agent conducting trade with Soviet Rusda on beltalf 
of such of our citizens as may seek profit through such trade. 
Bearing in &d the fact that the bulk of the goods required by 
Russia must be furnish4 upon credit, it would be necessary in 
either case for mr Government to accept the mrit ies  of Soviet 
Russia to the extent of billions of dollars. 
If there are no commercial individuals or bodies in Russia with 
wham our c i h  can trade, but only a Communist regime, which 
has arqated to i d f  the powers of governmat, whieh is the 
d y  body empowered to trade, asserling sole ownership of all 
Russian resources, raw materials, agricultural products, industrial 
establishments, and the like ; if moreover, that Communist regime 
is c o n f d y  inapabie of treating our business men honestly, 
and is bound to "t t h  at the completest disadvantage," why 
should American citizens in- in such a p r  risk? And if any 
considerable n m k  of citizens- do enter upon trade under these 
conditions, and are wronged by the Bolshwist Govmment, is 
it not p d d y  certain that &ey will demand that the Govern- 
rnent of the United State8 protect their rigbts, and that there will 
thus be drawn an exceedingly dangerous issue between the two 
Gwernments ? 
Vl. B o l s h u  Bw'nsss Methods 
If it is useless for individual busims men or firms to expct 
honest and honorabIe treatment at the hands of tbe Soviet Gov- 
ernment, is there any p o d  reason for M h h g  that ''-pitatist 
governments" would be better treated? All the available evidence 
tends to establirsh the contrary. Confining myaelf for the moment 
to trade quwions, let me cite a few specific ases from which 
individual citizens and wr Government may well take warning: 
At the San h n o  m d n g  of the Supreme Economic Council, 
May 22, 1920, the British representative made a report fonnally 
pmt&ng #hut o qmntdty of fk stwed at R d  was bm 
o f l m d  fw sak by thr agmts of the Swk t  Gwsrrmtslrf, noi- 
tv~~thstandig the fact thui it kpd &#dy bsm bought and paid 
for by thr British Gmmmmt. When I was in Sweden, in &te 
k, lm, much indignation was being expaessed by b a n k s  and 
merchants in Stockholm h u s e  gold tendered to Swedish firms 
in payment for gwds supplied, had been found to contain a large 
pematage of bismuth. Warned by the Swedish expiam, Brit- 
ish firms which were negotiating with thc Krassin Trade Mission, 
demanded that a clause be inserted in the contracts providing for 
an assay of the gold before its acceptance. This was surely a 
reasonable enough proposal, and one which the Soviet Govern- 
ment could hardy have declhed if it had been d u g  in good 
faith. As a matter of fact, the Soviet r e p w t i v e s  refused to 
agree to the demand and the negotiations were drop@ 
On June 26, 1920, at the yearly mating of the Datch-OJt- 
Europoisck~ Wirtschaftswerbud, held at Etbefeld, Germany, the 
whole question of trade between Germany and Soviet Russia was 
threhed out. Mr. Meyer, Manager of the Sodety, said : W e  
have negotiated with the representatives of the Soviet Govern- 
ment in 13erlin and in Copenhagen since 1919, and they have 
always tried (and failed) to fool us. They demanded OEQS of 
goods, promised a great deal, but as yet have done nothing. Thgt 
huw always found soma excuse for ttor abiding by their word . . . I do not think that it wil l  be possible for private firms to 
trade with Russia in the near future!' Quite similar is the 
shkment issued by the London representative of the N o m q h  
Gomnmcnt, in February, 1920. Though not charging the S e  
viet Government or its representative, Liwinov, with fraud, the 
statemeat did charge that Li~nov's eommerdat nqotktions with 
Norway were merely camoufhgd political darts. Mr. MjeIde 
said : "Mr. EtvipoVIs propwats are considered h p d b l e  froon 
a mmmerckI point of view, and in addition, he har &e Chum 
dsaknd81t on coditwns that would prwticdly hwIve p o w d  
rucognfin by Norway of Sovitrt Russia." At the meeting of the 
Supreme Economic Council, JuIy 26, 1m, a memorandum was 
submittad by the Norwegian representatives, d n g  forth that 
& timber offered for sale by the agents of the Soviet Gwv- 
trnrnmt was the proptrty of a Norwegian firm, and warning 
was given that n a e s a q  steps would be taken to contest the 
claims of any other person or persons to that timber. In can- 
neetion with the Norwegian protest, the British Foreign Ofiice, 
after consulting with the Supieme Ibaotnic Coancil gave this 
significant pledge: That the regulations which will be established 
in te8paa of g d s  hitherto belonging to British merchants and 
at present - izd by the Soviet Government, wiU bs extgndsd filly 
to fwdgn h d a s .  According to that pledge, the rule laid down 
by thc British courts in a recent case involving tide to certain 
timber disposed of by the Soviet Government would be applied 
to all similar cases in Great Britain, rtgardess of the uationaliw 
of the daimaats. 
fn the British case in question, a Russian firm having a btanch 
in England, secured a writ of attachment against certain timber 
WE& arrived at a British port from Soviet R d  It had been 
sold by Krassin and his colleagues, aeting as the agents of the 
Soviet Gwernment, to a British finn The claimant company 
p r o d  that the timber had belonged to it and has been c m h  
wed by the BolshePist G o v m t  in 1918. The judgmcnt of 
the court rcturned the timber to its original owners and denied 
the validity of the confiscation by the BoishePiki and the subse- 
quent d e .  Tbc dmision of Mr. Justice Roche, which is of the 
utmost importance in 'connection with this whole question, set 
forth bhe right of the Soviet Government to d s m t e  and s u b  
qumtiy dispose of property unald not be admitted in Great Brit- 
ain, kause, ' B e  British Government bad never mgnized the 
Soviet Government, which in this counm (Great Britain) had, 
thdore ,  no legal status," It is apparent that, according to Mr. 
Justice R d e ,  recogaition of the Soviet Power as the de jure 
Govemmmt of Rwsia would make it legal for one British Mer 
or set of traders to receive in payment the gods belonging to 
another trader or set of traders. 
Leaving the question of remgnition of the Soviet G o ~ c n t  
for examination a littie later on, let me deal, very briefly, with 
the matter of a ~ n o m i c  oncdons, and, in the Bol- 
shcvist policy as illustrated by the dealings with the V&iip 
syndicate already referred to. We must remember that the con- 
ctssions were offered to -can &tieens in part return for 
goods valued at s e d  hundreds of millions of dolIars, by the 
Soviet Government which is &dng credit here to tbe mnt: of 
several billions of dollars, and, at the same time, f l l  recognition 
by our Government. I quote translations- of extracts from 
spaeches by Lcnin and Zinoviev, published in the o5cial Bofshe- 
vist press, and respectfully suggest that the Committee on Foreign 
W m  request the State Department to supp1ement these with 
the translation of other important statements by the. responsible 
leaders of the Soviet Power upon questions of i n k m a t i d  pol- 
icy. The following passage is from an impoftant address dcliv- 
ered by Lenin at the Moscow C o n d o n  of the Communist 
Party in November, 11920, and reported in the Petrograd B d a  : 
"The differences between our enemies have recentty increased, 
particukrly in connection with the proposed c o n d o n  to be 
granted to a group of American capitalist sharh, headed by a 
multi4Onaire who reckons upon grouping around h i m d  a 
number of other multi-milliodrcs. Now all the communktions 
ooming from the Far East bear testimony to the fact that there 
is a feeling of bitterness in Japan in connection with 
this agrtemeat, dthorcgh the IMEY h a  not bsm signed yet a d  
i s  so far only o draft." 
On Nov. 23. 1920. the OW Bolshtvist paper, the Krmwya 
Gawtta, published a report of the same ad* contaihing the 
following paragraph dealing with the subject of concessions: 
"Ow gruntkg of concg~sions to the A d a ~  miibwires avill 
s t w e  to maAr relat iow batwetm JaQan and AtnBpiCa w u  
strained. Thwe ir  already tdk in Japan that Rw& i r  driving 
i f  to war d k  America. Wr shdi utiiise their emf& far wr 
oam imterssts. By signing concession agreements with the Boar- 
p is ic ,  we gain a moral as well as material victory, Our foes, 
burning with desire to crush us by armed force, are now com- 
pelfed to condude agreements with us, and to contribute ta ow 
consolidation and strengthening, To condemn us for signing 
the concessions would be right only i f  we wen able to owdraw 
apitalism throughout the worId with the dart of onc country.' 
On Dec. 1,1m, the Pmgmd Pravda, number a 0 ,  published 
tk of yet another sptech upon this subject by M. Ac- 
d n g  to this official Boldmist newspper, in addressing a meet- 
ing of semtaries of the Communist Patty Nuclei-the organiea- 
tim through which the numerically negligible Bolshevist minority 
contrives to dominate the majority-Lenin said : 
'We have been offered a plan of a concession on Kamhtka 
for ten years. The American billionaire stated frankly that 
M c a  wants to have in Asia a base for the weatuality of war 
with Japan. This billionaire said that if we will sell Runchatla, 
he can promise us such an enthusiasm among the population of 
the United States that the American Government will hmediatdy 
recognize the Soviet Power in Russia. If we shall merely lease 
it, the enthusiasm will be d t r .  
'Wntil now we bave defeated the bourgmkh because it docs 
not know how to act in unison, Now the mlaiiy between the 
United States u~4d fapan is grow'ng. We shall t a k  adwantage 
of this and d e r  to lease Kamhatka, instead of giving it away 
gmtis. Has not J a w  grabbed from us an i m m w  stretch of 
land in the Far East? It is far more advantageous to us to h s e  
Ksmchatka and obtain from thew part of its products, ina in 
mlity wc do not control it anyhow, and m o t  tte it. 
"The agreement has not yet been signed, but ws wg &$dy 
ut this rime intensifying fhs friction betwsm our msnrics, Also, 
it is a gqod form of concessions. We shall give away a few mil- 
lion dessiatines (1 M a t i n e  equals 2.7 acres) of forest in the 
Archangel Province which we are unable, in spite of our best 
tfiwts, to exploit. A chess-bard system will be established 
whereby our own parcel of forest comes alongside of a I d  
d o n ,  and this we shall be able to exploit, and our workers 
win thus learn technical skill from them. All that is  vwy dump 
tags- to us. 
"Concehw am act peace. They w e  a&o war, only in a dif- 
fwtd fomr, more udvuntagearrs to us. The wu wit1 be fought 
on the economic front. It is possible that they will try to restore 
free trade, but then they do not sign the qmment alone, without 
#. They are bound to abide by all our Iawq and in case of war 
the whok property rtmains a s  by right of mr. Comesions 
are merely a continuation of the war on an economic plaae, only 
in this case we no longer d m y  but, on the can-, d d a p  
our productive forces. No doubt they will attmnpt to deceive 
us and to evade our laws, bat then wn hawe d h  us the A& 
RICS~H, tfrr Moscow, the Prodtciol and dl th othw B f f t r d  
nary Commissions, so we do not fear them!' 
Thus the Bolsheviki are dying upon the Red Terror to deal 
with our investors. On Dee. &,19#), Zinoviev, by many w e d  
as the ablcst and most influential Bolshevist leader next to Le&, 
delivered an important address at a meeting in Petmgrad. From 
the report of that address published in the Pruwdo of Petrograd, 
number 281, Dee. 14, 1920, the following paragraphs are quoted: 
'The position is this: Our SaeiaIi republic is encircled by 
uipitalism. Obviously, Socialism and Capitatism cannot main- 
tain neighbourly relations for any jength of time History knows 
of two issues : either the world revoIution, w capitalism must win. 
But the period of "baIanoe" will last several ymrs. Meanwhile, 
the forms develop in such a manner that Socialism is gaiaiag 
s&agth, whilst Capitalism is d n g .  
'The quest.0~ of concessions is a question of ec:& 
between mmelvm and the Powers of the Wat. Some paoplc 
call this a Brest-Litovsk Such, however, is not the -. If WE 
are in need of commercial idations with the West, the Western 
Powers stand in greater & of trade with us owing to the un- 
precedented industrial and m m i c  crisis. 
"It is l i w i s e  wrong to state that in granting c o n d o n s  to 
Western Capitalism, Russia will come under its idhence and ~ E P  
come its colony. CBnccssiws would have tong s k  bcea agreed 
to by the West had they been altogether profitable. If t h e  be 
atry dangsr i~ cmtssions the kngsr is soZdy to the W e s t m  
copitafjsts, into whose cams the eoncessions may h'ng a smwe 
spait. 
'To use plain language, the gist of the matter is: who is go+ 
to be mtwitted? We think that we shalf outwit them, as we 
shall be -able of defending o a d v e s  in the eacounter with 
the business men of the West. 
"The d c  side of the question is very important. In carry- 
ing out thc COI~&M~S, ths ca$W&s d l  be corrrpell~d to urect 
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dl h& of plants whuh d l  in She md r&min in our poss8ssbn. 
As a matter of fact, in the present conditions tbe apitahts arc 
but a mcdium for the transfer of the riches they have accumulated 
to the common use of the world at large. 
Uft is therefore not a qucstim of seHirrg the comtry, brxt of 
using Western capital for world revolution. Tbat is our view 
whicb is shared by the workmen of the Wat . . . 
Team are being expr- that foreign qitd wilI cling to 
our property* will endeavuur to cheat and U v e  US, and will 
&Pit our r i c h  in a rapacious manner. I n  this c o n n ~ c h I  m 
shdi sse to it thd t k y ,  ond nut o w ~ e t s ~ ,  we fb IOSWS. 
'T@ with our raw matetiass, we shall a r r y  to the West 
the rt~01utianmy spirit, the prol&rian unity which have main- 
tained us in power for ova three years. We must to nmaIn 
at wee with dl countries as long as possible. C o d o n s  am 
one of the mesas to this end. It is dpuIated in our treaty that 
the owners of the concesion lose a11 the rights granted to them 
by the agraemcnt as scwn as hostile action is taken by the rcspec- 
tivt Governmnt. It should be noted that qudons of war and 
p c e  are decided by big bankers. War against us would obvious- 
ly be against d w k  iateres&" 
m. Thc Qwfios of S e d y  for Credif 
From these typical utterances by the responsible leaders of the 
Swiet Power, which might easily be supplemented by many edi- 
!orial declarations from the &dal Bolshevist press c & d  in 
the same spirit, it is apparent that the Bofshwist policy of offer- 
ing to grant great d c  d o u s  to Amerkn =pitdisk, 
is part of a Mdiavelian policy which has for its object the 
embroilment of this and h e r  nations in contnwersy and, ewn- 
tually, war. It bas no important beariag upon the present eco- 
nomic needs of Russia. Such mmdons  as that offered to Ger- 
man, Swedish and Norwegian syndicates, and by them rejected, 
must be entirety wortbless unless there is a large investment of 
eapitd to expIoit them. For such investment it i s  n e c m q  that 
there shorjd be at least that measure of sccurity which can only 
rest upon the good faith of tbe government granting the con- 
sion. From the forwing uthance~ by I d n  and Zinoviev it 
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can be clearly seen that there is not, and there cannot h, my 
assurance that tbe Bolsheviki wift not &sate the mpital in- 
vested in such c o n d o n s  and a d  the w&oncr thcmsdves, 
if and when it suits their purpose so to do. The m m a c ~  of con- 
6-tion is clearly expressed in the utteraaets quoted After all, 
this is perfectly natural and not at all surprising. Why should 
we expect the Bobheviki, whm primary object is the 
tion of capitalism, and who have confinted the capital of Rus- 
sian apitalits with xemorsdess severity, to tolerate American 
capitalists in Russia one day longer than desperate need fomca 
them to do so? 
To the members of the Senate Cammittee on Foreign Relations, 
and to all my fellow c i ~ ,  I mpeetfulfy submit that while 
this coimtry needs a great extension of its foreign trade u p  the 
basis of long-time well-secured credit, and can best serve the 
harrassed and stricken nations of Europe thereby, nothing mutd 
be more dangerous to us than to attempt such a large voIume of 
trade upon the basis of insecure credit, and especiany to incut 
the risk of prohable repudiation by the debtor nations. We know 
that the avowed purpose of the pramt rulers of Russia is the 
destruction of the prevailing economic systan throughout the 
world, and the overthrow of all existing non-Communist govern- 
ments. Can we suppose that they would fail to perceive that by 
repudiation of their obligations to our manufacturers arid traders 
and by the confiscation of millions or billions of A i d -  in- 
yeskents they could precipitate a d i s  && in this cwn- 
try? Can we reasonably M w e  that perceiving this opporhdq 
they would fail to make use of it? Let there be no mistake maat 
upon this point: We have already strained our economic sptm 
to the limit of safety, Such a financial and industrid CMS as 
could easily be precipitated by the Soviet Power by of 
the repudiation of its obligations to us and the conkation of 
American investments, a d  the inevitable ruin of many of our 
enterprises consequent thereon, might easily prove the of 
bringing. about the collapse of wr entire economic system. Noth- 
ing could weU be more certain or obvious than the fact that strcb 
an extensive track with Russia, under udsting conditions, w d d  
be an invitation to aeon& banlauptq a d  to d u t i o a  
May I remind you, in this conneEtion, that dange~ of repudia- 
tion and its disastrous consequences rests not only upon the per- 
fidy of the Bolsheviki, but equally upon the patriotism of the 
democratic anti-Bolshevist form of Russia? Paradoxid as this 
m y  at first seem, it is  entirely natural and quite easy of compm 
beasion, The Russian people are not, and cannot be, reconciled 
to Bolshwist rule The struggle against that infamous tyranny 
goes on, Soon or lateperhaps sooner than we are ready to 
meet the responsibilities which will thereby be placed before us+ 
the Bolshevist rule will either aollapsc of its own rottenness or 
be overthrown. When that bappcns, it is morally m t a b  that 
all agreemats e n t d  into by it will k repudiated and annulled. 
On March 2, 1920, there assembled in Paris* a repmcntative 
conference of Russian political leaders representing most of the 
democratic politid groups. That conference declared that : 
"The Russian people euilf nmw corrsidsr the agr~menls be- 
tween the So&# wig and other com#dis as &ding wpm thm.  
Thsy w*U not confirm any awatrgment by which the propwty 
looted by the S d t  rule from R ~ R  citketw m'ZZ be ucceptd 
i~ exchage . . . Stiii I ~ S S  will the Rwsian peoQl8 tolsratr 
fk dish.ibw#wn in i ts m e  and on its acco~mf,  of any of fhr State 
poperty of Russia" 
That declaration was sip.d by Frince G. E. Lvov, forrner 
Prime Minister in the Russian P d o n a l  Government; I .  I. 
Petrunkevitch, the founder of the Constitutional-Demaatic 
Party; A. I. Konovalov, f m e r  Vice-Prime Minister and Min- 
iskr of Trade and Industry in the Russian Provisional Govern- 
ment; Prof. Paul Miliukov, former Minister of Foreign Afiairs 
in the Provisional Government ; M. M. Vinaver, Chairman of the 
Central Committee of the Constitutional-Democratic Party; 
Vladimir Nabokov, leading member of the Cdtutional-Dmp. 
& Party; Boris Savinkov, former Minister of War in the 
-0nal Government and a prominent Sodalist-Revolution- 
ist; M. I. StaZJlwich, E. N. Kedrin, F. I. R d c h w ,  A. Snxir- 
nw, M. S. Adjemov, Prof. Boris Nolde, Prof. M. I. Rostopt4evL 
P. N. Gronsly, S, Bdeta~ov ,  S. G. L b o m v  and A. I, htkov- 
Rojw. 
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On Mar. 14, 1920, another conference was held in Paris, at- 
tended by prominent leaders of the AU-Russirtn Constituent AB- 
gembfy, which the Bolsheviki suppressed by force of arms, and of 
the Party of Socialists-Revolutionists, which in the election of 
1918 proved to k by far the largest political party in R h .  
Among the wnferees was Kerenslry, whose recent rehrrn to the 
Wership of the anti-Bolshevist forces of demmatic Russia is 
significant. A notable decIaration issued by this conference mds 
with these words : "We know that Russia gtill has to pasa through 
grave trials, but we a h  know that Russia will again become a 
great democratic country. And the t ~ & s  a d  o b l i g o l h  wkick 
her prssmi d e r s  rmry assfcm to conclude ira k w m r  and hi 
her with, cannot bs regarded as obiigutwy a d  binding upm 
f i t w e  RussiaU* 
IX. Thr Dattgw of &ted 'w8  Trda on Cre& 
Having regard to these things* I submit that large investmmb 
in Soviet Russia, or the extension of any codderable m o t t ~ t  of
credit to the Soviet Power-which is exactly what extensive trade 
with Russia mean+would jeopardize the entire economic life 
of America. Russia's needs are enormously in cxctss of any 
capital she has or can build up in any reasonable titlpe. In the 
ten years immediately preceding the World War, Russia's wpital 
building a p a d t y  amounted to not over one billion rubles (gold) 
per anaum; her present pressing d calf for an v d i t u r e  
of not less than thirty billion mbles (gold) in the k t  thre  
pars. This is oMousIy far in excess of her own c a ~ a d y  and 
must be furnished by foreign investors, if at all. Foreign qitd 
requires security, and Bolshevism, by its vcry nature, denies that 
sewfity. To dimhate capid and profit u p  capital b tbe 
raison #dm of Bolshevism. To accomplish that a d  the Bof- 
shwist rulers of Russia are ready and willing b use all wibk 
means, including confiscation and rtpudistion of every obligation. 
We have only to suppost millions or bitlions of Ameriarn QLPW 
to be invested in Russi2t--goods supplied on the credit bash of 
Russian securities, for -pI-nd the whole in- m~- -
*S# also Appendix on pp. =I. 
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d r d y  d At thd same time, f w the reasons d d y  g k t ,  
ond for others to follow, I would advise Amerkn traders against 
~ p t h g t ~ t & e w h h ~ o ~ d ~ e x m p t h s v c r y d  
way and with tfpC most mnpfeh burarm against 1- 
T r u n i n g n o p p t o t h e p u r e l y ~ ~ o f  &8ubjact,it 
i a  a dgwihnt faa that, ad- their doe prckitnipr 
to M e t  R d a ,  their Iceen interest in M o p i n g  aadt with 
~ s s m a n i f ~  by k h e a c t i v i Q o f ~ n u m t e ~ l l s ~ m m -  
~ d t h e f a c t t h a t . ~ t o t h t s b t e o f i n ~ d  
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ample : It is very well h o r n  that one of thc most p d q  d 
of Sovict Russia at tbe present time is a supply of s t d  tails and 
other s t d  and iron products. It is pcrhaps l a g  well hewn, W 
equdy h e ,  that h n y  possessea excessive st* of 
very products. She has bem obliged to cut her p r i a  abut  SO 
per cent. in order to get rid of this excess. She is at the m t  
time mdedling every st& praduang nation, including the 
United State, and the &ect of that capetition is reflected in tfie 
condition of the h e r i c a n  steel industry. We cwld not supply 
the Russian demand at prim which would c a m e  with the 
German prieea At the same time, Gumany is in dirt need of 
such food products and raw materials as Ruda normatfy cx- 
pwta She would welaome the barter of her actm steel and iron . 
products for grain, for example, whereas no mch trade would 
be possible for us with our own abundant grain supply. Yet the 
fact remains that Germany has not been able, despite vigorom 
darts on the part of her stat- and business mm, to effect 
any such -. 
In th is  conaeciion, kt me eall attention to the fact that whca 
I was in Stdcholm in Octok,  19M, I was credibly i n f d  
that at Riga there was an immense mount of merchmdk which 
had been consigned to Soviet Russia by British firms, and mi8 
being held up at Riga b u s t  the Bolshevist p d a d n g  agda 
either could not or w d d  not pay for the goods. I was aedibly 
informed that these goods consisted for the most part of 
vitally neressary to the people of Ru&a, such as ~~ im- 
p b t s ,  leather &, electrial machinery, condmsed d k ,  and 
so on. The representative of we British business house in- 
f o r d  me that these go& were king ietarned to England, in 
some instaacw, and in others sold in the Smndinavian coufttrie~ 
at a considerable loss. Since that time the Latvian paper, Pojo 
Koek, has published an inkndng attide corroborating tbis 
statement of conditions. Doubtless the Russian Division of the 
Bumu of Cornmewe and Mushy could f d s h  your &mmitke 
with precise and detailed information upon this most i m w t  
point* 
It is now quite weIl cstablishd that Soviet R d  docs not 
pwxss any Iarge superfluous st* available for export. Tbe 
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1-d of the '%ursting corn bins," referred to by Mr. Lloyd 
George in a famous speech in the House of Commons, bas now 
been thoroughty exploded. R d a ' s  natural resources are prac- 
W l y  unlimited, but there is a world of difference between p 
tenth1 wealth, such as ores in the ground, d actual 4 t h  
such as mined ores mdy for shipmeat. Such suppwes as thcrc 
are in Soviet Russia tuday are s tom Ieft over from the dd re 
ginse, and, except in yery insignihnt instances, an needed by 
the Russian pwple t h t d v e a  This is the uniform -Y
of the responsible Bolshevist ofiicials. The M m w  Pruda, 6- 
eial organ of the B o l s ~ ,  summed up the matter on Jan. 3, 
lm, when it said: '93ithcrto we have fieen living on the stores 
and mEhinery, the means af prdudon, which we inherited from 
the bourgeoisie. We have been using the old stores of raw mate 
rial, half-manufactured and manufactured goods. But these 
s t o m  are exhausted and the machinery is d n g  oat 
more and mom'' In that same month, Rykw, President of the 
Supreme Council of the Eiational Board of Economy, ddared 
that the lifting of the blockade could not solve the raw-matwid 
d s i s ,  but, "on the contrary, the lifting of the blockade . . . 
will mean aa increased demand for raw materials, as these are 
the only artides which Russia can furnish to Europe and ex- 
change for European commodities. The supplies of 0ax on hand 
are sufKcieut for a period of from eight months to a year. B#t 
are shall trot Bg able to export brgr panlitks of flax tabrod.'' 
There is no possibility of any large exports of flax or of wheat 
from Russia. Any exportation of these must be at the expense 
of additional misery and suffering infiicterl upon the Russian 
people. How miserably the attempt to e~change Russian wheat 
for Italian mauufactured goods, terminated, is presumably well- 
known to your Committee. The Boishm-ist monomist, Bagaiev, 
axredly said in the EKonomicheskaya Zhkn in Septmkr last 
that *There a be no question of the &ace of any surplus 
for export. We shall have to export what we are greatly in need 
of r w d v t s ,  merely for the putpose of getting something still 
mare Wispsable in exchange. Every imported loemotive, 
wtrg plough we get, will have to be paid for literally witb strip 
camd from the body of our aational industries." 
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f ignore for the moment the question of tht right of the 
Soviet Government to dispose of the st& of ~ ~ n m o d i h  they 
have seized and codmted,  and the question of our right to 
d v e  them in tradeI and submit simply that it k quite &dent 
that dl the commodities the Soviet Governmeat has available 
for cxpork* including the entire gold and platinum mewe, to- 
gether amount to only a and fraction of the value of the g& 
sought; that so far as that portion of the porn% trade is con- 
cerned, we are in no position to compete with Germany, for ex- 
ample, in view of her readiness to do a barter trade upon the 
basis of prices we cannot possibly meet; that what Soviet Russia 
requirts from us is an enormous amount of =edit, for which 
there is no security ia sight. As an economist I have no Mts- 
tion in saying that thue -not be any satisfactory &ty for 
extensive d t s  to Russia until there is such an organization of 
her praductive capacity as Bolshtvisn by its very nature p m  
crudes. 
XI. Tht GoM St+pfy of S&t R d  
About a p r  ago, as the rest& of Extewive iaqrtiriw I r& 
&e concIusion &at the total gold and platinum reserve of RMsia 
did not d ~,000,000 rubles, w about 300,000,000 do-. 
Whm I was in London in September and U c t o k  last, 1 ch& 
up my Wes against tho& compiled by the highest arrtfioritk 
in Englaad, and found fhat these investigators, working quite 
I independently, fiad arrived at practicaliy ideatical concIusi~1~. 
Since that athate was made there has been some augmentath 
of the total from d o u s  muma, including d t a r ~  conq- 
codscations and mining, but the upeditwe for goods a d  
propaganda abroad has certsinly been greater. It is m t a h  that 
the total now in powdon  of the Soviet -t does not 
CXCed 500,mpoo ruble!% w 250,OIX],000 dollars. Tbat this ead- 
mate is d v e ,  is pm$dty mtah The facts speak for 
themselves and require no hteqretation at my h d s .  
A very considerable part of the gold in pmsdon of tbe So- 
viet Governmat, approximately 120,000,000 d o l h  to 
R o a d .  Tt is part of tht Roumanian goId resene which was 
sent to Moscow f w safe k q i i I  before the Revolution of 1917, 
dma h was -#that it would fall inta the hands of 
r Z p ~ ,  The RsDmaniaa Gwmnmmt has hid claim t& thfs 
pla,andthePewi ~ y b e a n y ~ t e a s t o t h e v a l i d i i y o f  the 
cum. Wai* me more the d mlimpmbt ~ W S ~ Q L I S  of 
honolrand d i t y i n v o l v e d ,  it happareat tbtta-tsuch 
~ 1 8 ~ ~ f w & h r ~ ~ ~ b I & W &  
~ a r e o E b e r ~ l P d g a d ~ t h i s g d d , n o t a b I y ~ o f  
% It is m p t c d  u p  d i e  authority that the FrcnFh, 
whoaremmpying Memelm theRa&, ~ a l t g o t d w h i d a  
t h q T f i n d W n g ~ f r w a 3 R u & e v e n * i t f r m ~  
~ 0 f i r m d h s .  ~ i n s i s r ~ t t i l e ~ o f I t u r P .  
~ t o h , o n ~ t o f  t h ~ ~ l ~ t o t h e  fomwB.u&ta 
~ t , x n u s t k ~ w a f i r s t h ~ t h c p M o f  the 
RhGovmunmt.  h ~ o ~ ~ ~ t h g ~ ~ t b e ~ b f t h t  
S t l p r a n e ~ & C o u t P d I b t A p a l I , t b e F ~ ~ ~ ~  
£ o n a s t ~ ~ F r a n c e w o a l d G Z a i m & e ~ t p n l i t t i o a f r a n c s  
~ t o ~ t b e P d ~ w b i c b w m a a d e p o a f t 3 t r h  
RussiaoStrrteBddmmfiscattdbyth~~sbeviki. The* 
o f t f t e F d ~ t & f w t h t f i s t F r m c e w i l l  Nfamdr- 
amstmmsrecognk&eright of the Soviet &vammit to& 
-of theRus%hgold res@m$"alld pplll-hstitute- 
a g a i n s t a I I ~ b ~ a n d ~ ~ ~ ' w h o ~ ~ ~ g o r d  
paymu& from the Sovi  Goyemmat or its Whm we 
d d t o t b e c l ~ b y g o ~ ~ w i t h w b i c h w e w e r e ~  
h f h G W ~ ~ , t h e m t % d m ~ t b e N o ~ G o v e r r r r n c n t r t -  
~ t b e i i m k ~ e d f r m i t s n a t i d s , i t B c r c o m e r i q u i r c  
~ t t h a t w t c a a n a t a u z p t ~ ~ i n t r e r d e ~ h -  
~ t b a * o f ~ ~ d e ~ m p I l e a ~  
Xmbm-more t o t h e f a & t h a t t r a d t d t h S ~ c t h d a  
upn any cad$crabIe wde d y  r e p b  reeopnidoll of 
&ehi&Pewerasthed~jureGovemnmentnfRud Allthe 
bsdsths t i s~ 'b lcwi thout&rrecgni t i~cs lnbehdw3~ 
dae lhdbof our mdstiqg policy, wiehotrt the n- nf o f n g  
;ramrsefi as a sit@ cormnrr in the rcgalations laid down by om 
GPffertmsint, I t i s ~ t o e a e c t h a t i a f l w a B a t t E c & & ~  
~ t h a r s ~ ~ ~ f h h v 0 1 V & 1 # t E h ~ b y n ~  
means insuperable. They are not greater than 0 1 ~  which ds t  
in the c m  of Mexico, for example. It is also quite easy to 
why the Bolsheviki are so anxious to secure politid recogdtim. 
Their motives are both economic and politid. In the 6rst place, 
recognition wwld stamp with a certain legality their -tions 
and their trade in stolen goods. More impwtant than that, how- 
ever, is the facility it would afford them to promote sc&l d- 
tion in this country. 
The Bolsheviki are pledged to a policy of promoting social 
revolution throughout the world, and they have used the privi- 
leges and immunities granted to their agents and envoys in d o u a  
countries to foster revolt and to promote intrigues and conspira- 
cies subversive of the existing government. This they have d m  
without a single cxcqtioa, so far as I have k n  able to discover. 
The m r h e n t  of State could doubtless furnish your Committee 
with an illuminating m r d  upon this subject. On July 18, 1920, 
the Krmoya Gwerta published an artidc by Kamencv, the w d -  
known Bolshevist Ieader, in which he said: "Yes, we am hutch- 
ing a plot againsi Europe h m  in YOSEW end we hatching 3 
opealy.'' On August 14,1920, the Petrqpd P r d a  said : '%us- 
sia again foms the f m s  of world politia. Red T r q s  are hw- 
ing a way for the Communistic Revolution toward Europe, and 
are overthrowing the Treaty of Versdles, thtmby reliming the 
fettws ipnfosed upon G m n y  by the V d l e s  Trmty." These 
representative utterances must be considered in the Iight of b 
in's ddaration to the Conference of the Third International, 
Dec., 1919 : "The i n k m a t i d  policy of the Soviet Gommmt 
is guided by a realization of the interdependence of Soviet Rus- 
sia and World Revolution." They must be considered in the light 
of the statement in the article by Radek, published in M ' '"' 
Harden's Zukaft, Feb., f m, that "Sovid Russia, by i ts very 
existence is a ferment and propagatof of the inevitable World 
Revolution," and of TroiAfs statement, in F&., 1919, uOur 
whole policy i s  hilt #pun the expectoiiofi of this Rkuofdm." 
I d l  the attention of the Committee on Foreign Relations to 
the f oltowing clauses contained in the twenty-one conditions of 
admission to the Third International, formulated by Twrin. the 
suprene head of the Soviet Power: "In ahnost aU the ~~ 
of Europe and America the class war is entering the phase of 
dvil war. Under such conditions Communists can have no con- 
fidence in burgeois legality. Thsy we borrd to create m y -  
w k c  a ~arallet illegal organi8afiun which at the decisive moment 
wilt help the. party to fulfill its duty towards the Revolution" 
. . . "The duty of spreading Communist ideas embraces the 
special obligation to conduct a wigorous, s y s t m t k  propagada in 
the m y .  Where this agitation is hindered by exceptional laws 
it is to be airrid out by illegal means!' 
1 do not attempt to interpret the foregoing hnderistic Bol- 
shevist statements, nor do I comment w them. I desire simply 
to ask your honorable body to take cognizance of the fact that all 
the agreements the Bdshwiki have yet made with d e d  bur- 
geois governments they have violated and treated as mere "scraps 
of paper." When in June, 1919, the British Government arranged 
for the shipment of relief supplies for the alleviation of the suf- 
fering of the civilian population of Russia, the Soviet Govern- 
mat,  despite its solemn pledge, seized the supplies and appropri- 
ated them to the use of the Red Army. In like manner they 
violated their agreement in the matter of trade with the Coopera- 
tives. They sent the rqmmtatives of the Cooperati- to the 
United States aad to England and Fram to arrange for the re 
sumption of trade with Russia through the medium of the Coop- 
erativm. On Jan. 16, 1920, the Supreme Economic Council of 
the League of Nations agreed to resume trade with Russia 
through the Chgeratives, but the Soviet Government rcfustd to 
permit it, i d f i g  wgon recognirion as a cond4tiuw sins qm am. 
On Aug. 27,1918, the Soviet Government signed an agreement 
with Germany, an agreement initiated by itself, by which it under- 
took not tu indulge in "any agitation against the State and mili- 
tary institutions of Germany." Immediately thefeafter it began 
to violate the agreement and sent millions of rubles to Bertin for 
r e d u t i o n .  proprtganda-a fact admitted by Tchit~herin~ the 
Soviet Foreign Minister, in an official note to the German Foreign 
the ttxt of which was published in Isuestik Dee. 26, 1918. 
J o e  the d t e d  Bdshevist Ambassador to Germany, after 
his qmhion for his shameful misuse of tk customary diplo- 
ma&~ pridcges and immunities, hasted that "the Russian Gov- 
ernmeat as a whole, and its d t e d  reprexatative in Bedin, 
ucver catmaled thc fact that they were not o w  this artiEk 
and did not intcud to do so." h d y ,  Germaay bas M an- 
other unpl-t experience with the Bolshwiki, though thia em- 
cerns representatives of the Third fnteraatid arid not of the 
Soviet Government, as such. In practice this distinction is of 
vwy little consequence. Permission was givm to the Bolshevist 
delegatts, h v s k i  and Zinoviev, to visit Germany in eonnectiPn 
with a Sodalist Congress. The permit was given on the explicit 
mdwbkhg to refrain from political agitation. Both m a  so 
&amefuUy violated the terms of the agmmtnt that Dr. S* 
the German Foreign Minister, had to their expulsioPl from 
the country. 
Every government that has had official relations with tbe Bol- 
shrviki through d t e d  envoys has been trcachmly  at- 
tacked and campelled to ex@ the envoys for &grant denses, 
including the misuse of their diplomatic privileges and immunities 
to foment revolutionary agitation. Great Britain had to 
U-v, the Bolsbwist dip1omat. It was pwed, in a Brirtiah 
a r t ,  that: Litvinov had wed his privileged position to indtc 
rmoIutioaary conspiracies to overthrow the British Govemmmt. 
When Litvinov was chosen to head the Soviet Trade Mission 
to -laad h i t  ytar, the British Governmeat refused to receive 
him, so Kamenev was sent instead. Kamenev's conduct was so 
outrageous that he was compelled to leave the country. H e  dt 
likrately altered official messages from his Govtrtmmt which 
he had W ordered to submit to the British Gwcrammt, far the 
purpose of misl~ading the l a m ,  and in spite of pledges given 
by himelf and his Governmeat that he would abstaia from dl 
propaganda, d i m  or indirect, he actively prkiptcd in the sub 
ddiziag of the D d y  He& out of funds rtalized from the saeret 
and illegal sale of stolen Russiaa jewels. Not in the diplomatic 
history of a hundred years, I venture to say, can tha-e be found 
any parallel to the acoriation of this Bolshevist diplomat by 
Mr. Uoyd George, the British Premier, on S e p ~  10, I-, in a 
five hat conferenoe. 
S w i M  had to txpel the &itd Bolsheoist rep-- 
ti= for their intrigucs, taking thm to the Swiss frontier in 
g m r d c d m o t o r ~  Denmarkhadtocompelther€gtdar801- 
&&zt envoy and Litvviaov, the Bolshevist: trade rqresmtativt, 
to lave the country on account of their participation in move 
merits niming at revolution in Denmark. Sweden, which had a 
Sacial-Demoeratic Government, and readily received the Mshe- 
vist Minister, had to expel him and cl08t the Legatia. M w ,  
who had h e n  permitted to reside in Christiania, and to conduet 
trade negotiations on behalf of Soviet Russia, was orderad to 
1- the country by the Norwegian Government, again 
of his participation in movements directed against the very ex- 
isttnct of the Now- State. 
This is only a partial mord such as a private individud has 
been able to gather from such sourccs as are open to private 
individuals. Doubtless the Depaftment of State is in pcmxsioa 
of much more complde data. Upon the basis of the evidence 
huan contained, I respectfully submit to the Committee on For- 
eign Relations of the United States Senate that two condusiuns 
are MstibIe ,  n d y  : (1) That there is no reason for changing, 
in any psrticular, the pr-t policy of refusing to rewgnk, hold 
official rclatiom with or receive thi: agents of the Soviet Govern- 
ment ; (2) The prcsmt policy with - to the regulation of 
trade relations with Soviet Russia &odd be maintained as king 
in complete harmony with American id& and the best trditim 
of our dealings with other nations. 
Old Bennington, Vermont. 
January 24, 1921. 
JOHN SPARGO. 
APPENDIX 
After the Bdunarandum was sabfiitasd to the Canmithe am 
Pcadgn Rdations of the United Statm Senate, an important GI- 
f m  of the members of the 41-Russian Coastihlmt U y  
tmk p*e in Paris, The Confcrtaoe was attcadedby 
reprcm#ives of all Russian dmmtic  f d n s  o p p x d  to 
Botsbwibim. Among the leaders of the ~ t n ~ - ~ t i c  
Party there were premt Paul N. Miliukov, former Minlsber of 
I 
Foreign A a t s  in the Russian ProvisMd Governmat; A, 1. 
Konodov, one of the laders of tL Russb industry and for- 
mer Minister of Trade and Industry in the Prod- Govcm~ 
and M. M. Vinavet, Chaifman of ttst h t r d  Gmdttte 
of the Constitutional-Demoefatic Party. Amoag the 1- of the 
Social Revohtimutry Party there were w t  A. F. Kacaskp, 
former Prime Minister in the Provisional Governmeat of Russia ; 
H. D. Avhmtiev, former Minister of Interior in the P d d  
Goytmm&, who was &sen Chaiman of the Conferen&; Cathe 
rine Breshkovsly, the "Grandmother of the Russian &dl- 
h"; Victor M. Cbmov, former Minister of Agriculture in * 
R& M o d  Gwcmmat anand President of the AU-&IS- 
sian Constituent Assembly, and V. M. Zcdnov, former mem- 
ber of the Dieorate of Five and one of the editors sf dm 
Volia 1Rossii." Nicholas V. T a ,  th wAmm leader of 
the Party d People's Shalists and former head of he A&- 
angel Gmemmmt, dso partiapatd in the Confcreace. The &I- 
ference adoptd unanimuusly the f olloroing. kfaratim : 
'TIaving deli- upon the pr-t international p d t h  of 
flus!&, the Conferam of Deputiw of the comthmt As-bty 
d d m % :  
1.) Aft# its liberation the March Rewl&oplr R d  
CUM f#VW PMP&~ ~s$o- nCr S k@ 
brly iks  B o k M  Cymmy, whiQ r q d b t e ~  the most dames- 
tsry p d d p l a  of popular d e  and civil W x d b ,  which - 
only upon the brute f m  of bayacts d futhfcss m m ,  de- 
stroying systematically the economic s h d w e  of the aoantry d 
& V h g f ~ ~ ~ p ~ e ~ n h ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ c ~ m ~  
l a b  of d a d  workers and peasants. By gamd and con- 
stant uprishgs, the masses of the people demonsb~te deaily 
their impfaably hostile attitude towards the existing regime. 
Only a govefnment wbich rests upon popuh recognition is s 
lawful authority and can be recognized as such by foreign 
powers, with all the ecnsequenees that follow therefrom. 
2.) The peoples of free Russia cmnot hdd themdws botrtrd 
to respect any agreements and contracts whdsoever which may 
be concluded by the BoLshdM supposedly irr the n a m  of t h  
Rw&n St&#. It will therefore be the first duty of a ra t& 
lawful Government of the Russian State, resting upon universal 
recognition, to declare as not binding upon itself all international 
agreements and contracts concluded by the Bolshevist power. 
All trade q r m e n t s  will n d y  k revised from a stand- 
point of their consistency with the vital i n t e e  of Russia, the 
freedom of her economic development and her absolute sov- 
ereignty. As for the manner of meeting Russia's indebtedness to 
other countries, contracted prior to the 7th of November, 1917 
(October 25, 1917, old style), as also the question of deterrain- 
iag the losses sustained by Russia during tbe War, and the man- 
ner of indmdiation, and, generally, the problem of settling 
thc mutual f i n a n d  obligations between Russia and foreign pow- 
ers,& questions will have to be settled at a special Interna- 
tional Conference after the reestablishment of a C;owmment in 
Russia that will enjoy general popular recognition. 
3.) It i9 tlew3w.q to m o v e  all mtifxial barriers in the way 
of resuming the economic contact of Russia with the rest of the 
world and to terminate the blockade in all its forms, for tbc bar- 
den of the bloekadc as a systua of fighting a pvcmmmt r&s 
mainly upon the shoulders of the innmat population. Onty 
after the lifting of the b l d d e  will the masses understand fully 
where the red source of all their unbaarablt, inhuman MCS 
lies, for it is not so much in the bldade, which, as a matter 
of fact, gripped Russia three years before the Bolshevist up 
heaval, as rather in the entire economic policy of the Bolshevild 
that the cause of the total destmctiw of the a a t i d  monomy 
of that great country is to be loaked for. 
The Conference d m  it its duty to point out the terrible 
#he I!- a 
danger that Iies in the possir'bility tZlat in tbe course of the retom- 
tion of the mmomic h d s  between our cwntry and the mbi& 
world, the attempts of the Bolshcviki ta p$pona the horv of ddt 
inevitable collapse at dl aodfts may 4 y  h d  mppwl in auk 
ddc ~ E o r t s  to turn the Bolshevist pnwer into a wapoa of the 
political and economic ensZavemeat of R u s h  Hum, dl at- 
- tempts to utilize tbe r e n d  of ofnami~ bonds with Rrrssia for 
her d c  enslavement, w for a Wstdq up, 
against the popular will, of the rule of the BoIshdd usarpera, 
who wilI b txpeEtad to play the part of a native police force for 
! ttre pmtectim of the intertsts of rapacious foreign Wtd, will meet with our emph&, active pmt&. 4,) Prweeditlg from t h e  d d e f a t h s ,  tlrs C m f m @  rr- ~Ildiadgs UI biding forts of the concmsions f h d  w6 b- g h m  w a y  to  foreigrrws by the So& power, fm in this ins- the invitation of foreign capital emanates from an authority whiGb has not been recognized by the people, and it is done on 4- tim which tuta the granting of amssions into a Mag of the property of the Russian State, infringing upon th~ in- atrd ri#b of the Citkw, and o d d v e  to our dvic a d  national sentiments. Likewise, we must considtr the J b g d  sqwdedsg of the Rw- &J gold ~ H ~ I I  by the Bo&he&t pow@ o l&g of t k  S W ,  this 'reserve biGiag the basis of the mmacy and financial gyatmn of the mantry. The dissipation of this - d l  uadeda~  the very possibility of a speedy economic regamah of ICussia. 
Ths Confwme protests m p h d k d l y  foreign cmu#Wp 
in sach disdp&.* 

